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I. INTRODUCTION
The New York Times recently reported that the United States
incarcerates one in 100 adults.1 This staggering figure brings into
perspective the social policies surrounding sentencing jurisprudence in
this country and the paramount importance of ensuring that the judiciary
can effectively implement penological policy in a constitutional manner.
Recently, the Supreme Court has recognized the inherent collision
between the mandatory application of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (“the Guidelines”) and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury.2
The heart of the debate centers on who should ultimately decide the
factual basis for increasing a criminal defendant’s sentence and what
policies should be taken into account when crafting an individualized
sentence.3 The serious practical implications of this jurisprudential
debate take on an increasing sense of urgency against the backdrop of an
exploding prison population.4 The Supreme Court recently addressed

1
Adam Liptak, U.S. Imprisons One in 100 Adults, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
29, 2008, at A14.
2
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
3
See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Jones
v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
4
The prison population grew last year by 25,000 people, bringing the total prison
population to almost 6 million. The last three decades has seen the total prison population
nearly triple. The report also found that “[i]ncarceration rates are even higher for some
groups. One in 36 adult Hispanic men is behind bars, based on Justice Department figures
for 2006. One in 15 adult black men is, too, as is one in nine black men aged 20 to 34.”
Liptak, supra note 1.
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some of these issues, albeit narrowly, in Rita v. United States5 and United
States v. Gall.6
In Rita, Justice Souter began his dissent with what is perhaps an
understatement: “[a]pplying the Sixth Amendment to current sentencing
law has gotten complicated, and someone coming cold to this case might
wonder how we reached this point.”7 Indeed, since the Supreme Court
issued its landmark sentencing decision in United States v. Booker8
changing the Guidelines from mandatory to advisory, the exact operation
of the discretionary scheme has fueled contention and litigation.9 In
particular, circuit courts struggle to apply the reasonableness standard of
review mandated by the remedial portion of Booker, vindicating Justice
Scalia’s characteristically caustic remark that such an inchoate standard
would create a “discordant symphony of different standards varying from
court to court and judge to judge. . . .”10
Despite the Supreme Court’s most recent sentencing decisions,
reasonableness review remains problematic. The Court’s decisions in
Rita and Gall have reinforced a tendency among the circuit courts to
review sentences that deviate from the Guidelines in a manner
inconsistent with the advisory scheme mandated in Booker.11 In
5

Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
United States v. Gall, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). A companion case was
Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007), in which the Supreme Court held that
a court may “consider the disparity between the Guidelines’ treatment of crack and
powder cocaine offenses.” Id. at 564. Kimbrough, however, is beyond the scope of this
comment’s focus on the Court’s treatment of reasonableness review in Rita and Gall.
7
Id. at 2484 (Souter, J., dissenting).
8
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
9
See, e.g., United States v. Gall, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007); Rita v. United States,
127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007); Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J.,
dissenting), vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v.
Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007).
10
Id. at 312 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11
See United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding a downward
departure unreasonable in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006) factors); United States v.
Coughlin, 500 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the district court did not
appropriately weigh the factors under section 3553 of the Guidelines); United States v.
Bradford, 500 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the sentence reflected an
overemphasis on the relevance of the details of the offense and the defendant’s history
under section 3553(a)(1) and accorded insufficient weight to existing congressional
policy and the need to minimize sentencing disparities); United States v. Hatcher, 501
F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2007) (reversing the sentence because the district court gave too much
weight to an improper factor); United States v. Garcia-Lara, 499 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir.
2007) (concluding that district court ignored Congress’s policy of targeting recidivist
drug offenders for more severe punishment and failed to distinguish the defendant from
other career offenders); Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J.,
dissenting), vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008) (reversing sentence as
substantially unreasonable because the district court failed to properly weigh sentencing
factors); United States v. Willingham, 497 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2007) (reversing sentence
6

450

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 4:447

particular, the presumption of reasonableness endorsed in Rita further
insulates within-Guidelines sentences, creating a de facto mandatory
scheme.12 The reasonableness standard of review remains ambiguous,
enabling circuit courts to effectively review sentences de novo, in further
contravention of Booker.13 In addition, reasonableness review is
vulnerable to as-applied challenges, similar to those raised in Booker.14
Finally, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the Guidelines as the
centerpiece of sentencing perpetuates a misguided system held to be
unconstitutional in Booker.
Central to these issues is the interplay between the substantive and
procedural reasonableness review. Substantive review requires an inquiry
into the sufficiency of the factors the sentencing court considered during
sentencing, whereas procedural review ensures that the lower court took
the appropriate factors into consideration.15 This comment proposes that
the Supreme Court should effectuate a procedural review that would
allow an appellate court to reverse a sentence only if the sentencing court
relied on inappropriate or clearly erroneous facts. Such a system would
ensure that sentencing judges truly have discretion to impose a sentence
within the statutory range as required by Booker.
Furthermore, this comment suggests that the Supreme Court should
deemphasize the Guidelines as a starting point in the sentencing process
by stressing the reasoned analysis of the statutory sentencing factors,
including but not privileging the Guidelines. These reforms would
promote the integrity of the current Sixth Amendment sentencing
jurisprudence developed through a complex line of cases.
The Constitutional cracks in the mandatory Guidelines scheme
began to emerge after a series of cases asserted that the Guidelines
because district court gave too much weight to irrelevant factor); United States v.
D’Amico, 496 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2007) (applying proportionality review and reversing
sentence as substantially unreasonable). But see United States v. Sanchez-Ramirez, 497
F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2007) (upholding sentence under the Guidelines as reasonable in light
of the defendant’s egregious conduct); United States v. Keller, 498 F.3d 316 (6th Cir.
2007); United States v. Gammicchia, 498 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming sentence
that fell within the Guidelines as substantially reasonable, and applying presumption of
reasonableness); United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming
sentence that fell below the range in the Guidelines as substantively reasonable).
12
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
13
See, e.g., Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007), vacated, reh’g
granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008). Despite being vacated, this does not change the
relevance of the opinion, and perhaps further illustrates the difficulties that the circuit
courts face in applying the reasonableness standard of review. United States v. Tomko,
No. 05-4997, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 988 (3d Cir. Jan. 17, 2008) (order vacating
judgment and granting rehearing).
14
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2475 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
15
United States v. Gall, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007).
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effectively transferred the fact-finding function from the jury to the
judge.16 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court examined a New
Jersey hate-crime statute that increased the defendant’s sentence upon a
judicial finding that the offense was committed “with purpose to
intimidate,” holding it unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment.17
Subsequently, in Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court invalidated a
state sentencing scheme that, like the federal Guidelines, calculated
sentences based on judge-found factors.18 Finally, in United States v.
Booker, the Supreme Court held the mandatory application of the
Guidelines as unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment, and required
appellate courts to review sentences for reasonableness instead of using a
de novo standard.19
Booker, however, provided little guidance to courts applying
reasonableness review.20 Consequently, divergent interpretations among
the circuit courts of appeals began to emerge concerning the scope and
operation of Booker.21 Some courts viewed Booker as transforming the
Guidelines-dominated or Guidelines-centric approach of the postSentencing Reform Act era into a system that relegates the Guidelines as
one sentencing factor among several policy considerations outlined by
Congress.22 Other courts continued to give great weight to the Guidelines
both in application and in review.23 Courts embracing the latter view
have adopted two distinct doctrinal approaches: (1) the presumption of
reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences, and (2) the requirement
that district court judges provide proportionately compelling reasons
whenever sentences substantially deviate from the Guidelines, a doctrine
known as the “proportionality principle.”24 The Supreme Court recently
16
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227 (1999).
17
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
18
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004).
19
Booker, 543 U.S. at 226.
20
See id. at 261–62.
21
See, e.g., Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157, 173 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J.,
dissenting), vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v.
Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Bradford, 500 F.3d 808 (8th
Cir. 2007) (applying proportionality principle); United States v. Coughlin, 500 F.3d 813
(8th Cir. 2007) (applying proportionality principle).
22
See Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665, 666–70
(2006) (citing a statistical analysis of courts continuing to impose sentences within the
Guidelines and of courts that viewed Booker as minimizing the effect of the Guidelines
on sentencing determinations).
23
Id.
24
See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007) (reviewing appellate court’s
adoption of presumption of reasonableness); Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007)
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considered these approaches in Rita v. United States25 and Gall v. United
States,26 respectively.
In Rita, the Supreme Court held that an appellate presumption of
reasonableness for a within-Guidelines sentence is consistent with
reasonableness review.27 The Supreme Court’s decision in Gall28 rejected
the Eighth Circuit’s application of the “proportionality principal.”29
Taken together, the Court’s most recent sentencing jurisprudence
illustrates the difficulties of fashioning a cohesive sentencing regime that
effectively reconciles policy and Constitutionality. Although the
Supreme Court has taken substantial steps to rectify ambiguities in
federal sentencing jurisprudence, the circuit courts continue to confront
the difficult task of reviewing sentences under a reasonableness standard
that remains vague and difficult to apply.30 In essence, Justice Scalia’s
lamented “discordant symphony” 31 remains at full volume.
Two recent circuit court decisions that represent the problems
associated with applying reasonableness review are United States v.
Tomko32 and United States v. Wachowiak.33 In Tomko, the Third Circuit
provided a particularly lengthy discourse between the majority and the
dissent as to the proper role of an appellate court in reviewing a sentence
in light of Rita.34 The majority reversed the district court’s sentence,
concluding that the judge improperly weighed the sentencing factors.35
The dissent in Tomko argued that the majority had essentially reviewed
(reviewing appellate court’s adoption of proportionality principle); United States v.
Bradford, 500 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying proportionality principle); United States
v. Coughlin, 500 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying proportionality principle).
25
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2456.
26
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 586.
27
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2456.
28
Originally, the Supreme Court considered the issue of proportionality in United
States v. Claiborne, 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007), a companion case to Rita. However,
Claiborne’s death rendered the case moot, delaying the Court’s consideration of the issue
until the following term.
29
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 591. Originally, the Supreme Court considered th issue of
proportionality in United States v. Claiborne, 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007), a companion case
to Rita. However, Claiborne’s death rendered the case moot, delaying the issue until the
following term. Id.
30
See, e.g., Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157, 173 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J.,
dissenting), vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008) (arguing that the
majority’s re-weighing of the factors cited to support the lower court’s sentence was
tantamount to de novo review); United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir.
2007) (upholding sentence as substantively reasonable despite disagreeing with the
sentencing court’s analysis of the sentencing factors).
31
Booker, 543 U.S. at 303–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32
498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007), vacated, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008).
33
496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007).
34
See Tomko, 498 F.3d at 159–85.
35
See Tomko, 498 F.3d at 173.
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the sentence de novo in contravention of both Rita and Booker.36 In
Wachowiak, the Seventh Circuit upheld a sentence that deviated from the
Guidelines, noting that although reasonable minds could differ as to the
appropriateness of the sentence, Booker and Rita required deferential
treatment of the district court’s judgment.37
In essence, the scope and application of reasonableness review
remain problematic. This confusion stems from the Supreme Court’s
failure in Rita and Gall to address several fundamental criticisms of
reasonableness review. Specifically, the Supreme Court: (1) endorsed a
presumption of reasonableness review that further insulates withinGuidelines sentences, creating a de facto mandatory guideline system;
(2) failed to provide adequate guidance for both appellate and district
courts as to the scope and application of substantive reasonableness
review; (3) left intact a conception of substantive review vulnerable to
as-applied constitutional challenges; and (4) issued opinions replete with
misguided Guidelines-centric language that frustrates the remedial
mandate of Booker.
In order to remedy the fundamental flaws inherent in the current
reasonableness review scheme, the Supreme Court should elevate
procedural review over substantive review to create a system in which
appellate courts could only reverse sentences that relied on
impermissible factors or clearly erroneous facts. In doing so, the Court
would preserve the integrity of the advisory scheme enacted under
Booker by giving sentencing judges true discretion to depart from the
Guidelines. Furthermore, the Court should underscore the totality of the
statutory factors enacted by Congress as the basis for sentencing rather
than emphasizing the Guidelines. This “parsimony-centric” approach
recognizes the overarching sentencing instruction mandated by Congress
requiring that a sentence be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to
achieve the legislative goals.38
II. AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW
Federal sentencing changed dramatically after the enactment of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.39 Prior to the statute, Congress gave
36

Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744, 745 (7th Cir. 2007).
38
See Douglas A. Berman, Punishment and Crime: Reconceptualizing Sentencing,
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 49–50 (2005) (discussing the development of the parsimony principle
and its relationship to section 3553). Although this comment has not revealed a credited
source for the term “parsimony-centric,” it will use the term to refer to what Michael W.
McConnell described as “Booker-maximalism,” coupled with an emphasis on the
statutory parsimony principle. See McConnell, supra note 22, at 666.
39
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987.
37
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judges wide latitude to impose sentences within the statutory range set
forth under the substantive law.40 This broad discretion created the
perception that different judges would impose disparate sentences for the
same offense.41 Therefore, Congress created the Sentencing Commission
and charged it with the task of promulgating a system that would guide
judicial discretion in a manner consistent with the penological goals of
punishment outlined in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.42 Pursuant to
this mandate, the Sentencing Commission produced the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, a rubric which establishes a sentencing
subrange43 based on an offender’s criminal history and offense level.44
After nearly a decade of mandatory application of the Guidelines to
sentences, several cases challenged the constitutionality of the system.45
The most significant of these early challenges was Apprendi v. United
States,46 followed shortly thereafter by Blakely v. Washington.47 The
defendants in each case challenged the constitutionality of the sentencing
statutes in each respective state. These statutes required a trial judge to
make findings of fact independent of the jury in order to enhance
sentences.48 In both cases, the defendants argued that such judicial
findings of fact violated their Sixth Amendment right to a jury.49 The
Supreme Court agreed with the defendants in each instance, opening the
field for challenges to the federal Guidelines system.50 The successful
challenge appeared in United States v. Booker,51 a landmark decision that
40

Roger W. Haines, Jr., Federal Sentencing Guidelines Handbook, 1 (2006); See
also Berman, supra note 38, at 3.
41
See Haines, supra note 40, at 1 (noting that one of the goals of the Sentencing
Commission was to promote uniformity).
42
Id.
43
Subrange is a term of art used to describe the Guidelines range of sentencing
established within the statutory range under the substantive law. See, e.g., Rita v. United
States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2486 (2007).
44
Haines, supra note 40, at 1.
45
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227 (1999).
46
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
47
542 U.S. 296 (2004).
48
See id. at 298; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469. Blakely plead guilty to
kidnapping charges. Blakely, 530 U.S. at 298. The facts admitted in the plea agreement
authorized a sentence of fifty-three months, however the sentencing judge imposed an
additional ninety months, finding that Blakely qualified for an “exceptional”
enhancement. Id. Similarly, Apprendi plead guilty to charges related to shooting into a
home and received an enhanced sentence under a New Jersey hate-crime law. Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 468–69.
49
See id. at 298; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.
50
See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 314; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497.
51
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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rendered the mandatory Guidelines scheme unconstitutional, and
substituted an advisory scheme whereby appellate courts were to review
sentences under a new “reasonableness” standard.52 Left with little
guidance from the Supreme Court, however, the circuit courts of appeals
began to develop their own principles to facilitate the new sentencing
system.53
One practice that arose within the circuits is the judicial application
of a presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentences. In
Rita v. United States, the Supreme Court held this presumption
constitutional in light of Booker.54 Other circuits began to apply a
proportionality principle to sentencing, essentially requiring district
courts to justify a sentence in relation to the amount the sentence varied
from the Guidelines range.55 For example, if a sentence reflected a 100%
variance from the established Guidelines range, the sentencing judge
would have to provide the strongest possible justification for the
sentence.56 In Gall v. United States, however, the Supreme Court struck
down this doctrine, finding a violation of Booker’s mandate that district
court sentences be afforded due deference under reasonableness review.57
A. The United States Sentencing Guidelines and the Sentencing
Commission
Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“the Act”)58
to establish the statutory framework for sentencing within the federal
judiciary. The Act instructs the sentencing judge to impose a sentence
consistent with the policy statements set forth under 18 U.S.C. § 3553.59
Pursuant to section 3553(a), a judge must consider: (1) the characteristics
of the offense and the offender; (2) the need for a sentence to reflect the
basic aims of sentencing, which are just punishment, retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation; (3) the sentences legally
available; (4) the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) the Sentencing Commission
policy statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted disparities; and (7)
the need for restitution.60 Guiding the policy statements is the so-called
52

Id. at 245.
See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 177 F. App’x 357 (4th Cir. 2006), aff’d, 127 S. Ct.
2456 (2007) (applying presumption of reasonableness); United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d
884 (8th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007) (applying proportionality principle).
54
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459 (2007).
55
See, e.g., United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006).
56
See id.
57
Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
58
18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2006).
59
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).
60
Id. at § 3553(a)(1)–(7).
53
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“parsimony principle,” which instructs the judge to “impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve these basic
objectives.61 The provision also provides that when the court announces a
punishment, it must state the reasons for imposing a particular sentence
in open court.62
At the same time, Congress established the United States
Sentencing Commission (“the Commission”), an independent agency in
the judicial branch,63 in order to facilitate the policy goals set forth by
Congress.64 Pursuant to this mandate, the Commission65 created the
United States Sentencing Guidelines,66 a comprehensive manual that
provides sentencing ranges based on a defendant’s criminal history and
the severity of the criminal conduct.67 In order to maintain flexibility, the
Guidelines provide that a sentence may “depart” from the applicable
Guidelines range if the sentencing judge identifies factors not taken into
consideration by the Commission.68 Under the original Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, a within-Guidelines sentence was mandatory,69 and,
pursuant to a subsequent provision enacted in 2003, was reviewable by
an appellate court de novo.70

61

Id. at § 3553(a).
Id. at § 3553(c).
63
An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, http://www.ussc.gov/
general/USSCoverview_2005.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2008).
64
28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2006) (indicating that the Sentencing Commission’s basic
objectives are to “assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in
3553(a)(2). . . .” In addition, the Commission “must seek to ‘provide certainty and
fairness’ in sentencing, to ‘avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities,’ to ‘maintain
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing
practices,’ and to reflect to the extent practicable [sentencing-relevant] advancement in
[the] knowledge of human behavior.”). See also Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2464.
65
The Commission is comprised of seven voting members appointed by the president
and confirmed by the senate. No more than three of the members may be federal judges
and no more than four may belong to the same political party. See supra note 63.
66
The Commission took an “empirical approach,” examining thousands of presentence reports and making adjustments in accordance with congressional instructions.
Haines, supra note 40, at 1.
67
See supra note 63.
68
Id.
69
One provision provides that the court “shall impose” a within-Guideline sentence
“unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from
that described.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b)(2). As discussed later in this comment, the
mandatory language within this provision was held to be unconstitutional in the remedial
portion of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
70
The Court first considered the issue of appellate review in Koon v. United States,
518 U.S. 81 (1996), holding that the appropriate standard of review for sentences is abuse
62
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B. Jones v. United States: A Sixth Amendment Challenge
Although the Supreme Court rejected any initial constitutional
challenges to the Guidelines system on separation of powers grounds,71 a
new line of cases raising Sixth Amendment issues eventually
undermined the federal mandatory Guidelines system and similar state
sentencing schemes.72 The first significant challenge of this nature was
Jones v. United States.73
In Jones, the government convicted the defendant under a statute
that provided for a substantial increase in the maximum penalty
depending on whether the defendant’s conduct resulted in “serious
bodily injury” or “death.”74 In the case, the indictment failed to reference
the specific provision carrying the heightened penalty or the alleged facts
consistent with that provision.75 However, the trial court, upon a finding
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s conduct resulted
in “serious bodily injury,” imposed the higher sentence.76
On appeal, the Supreme Court recognized the Sixth Amendment77
implications that occur when a judge makes a factual finding which
increases a defendant’s exposure to a higher sentence.78 Consequently,
of discretion. However, Congress subsequently overruled Koon and changed the standard
of review to de novo under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006).
71
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (holding that the Sentencing
Guidelines reflect neither an unconstitutional delegation of congressional authority nor a
violation of the separation of powers doctrine).
72
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227 (1999).
73
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
74
Id. at 230.
75
Id. at 230–31.
76
Id. at 231.
77
U.S. CONST. amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
78
Jones, 526 U.S. at 227. (“[T]here is reason to suppose that in the present
circumstances, however peculiar their details to our time and place, the relative
diminution of the jury’s significance would merit Sixth Amendment concern. It is not, of
course, that anyone today would claim that every fact with a bearing on sentencing must
be found by a jury; we have resolved that general issue and have no intention of
questioning its resolution. The point is simply that diminishment of the jury’s
significance by removing control over facts determining a statutory sentencing range
would resonate with the claims of earlier controversies, to raise a genuine Sixth
Amendment issue not yet settled.”).
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the Court construed the statute as establishing three separate offenses
with distinct elements that the prosecution must prove to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.79 However, the decision was limited to the specific
provision at issue, effectively obviating the Sixth Amendment issues
troubling the Court.80
C. Apprendi v. New Jersey: A State Sentencing Enhancement Violates
the Sixth Amendment
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court confronted a similar
challenge in Apprendi v. New Jersey.81 In Apprendi, the defendant pled
guilty to charges relating to a series of shootings82 which, pursuant to a
plea agreement, carried a maximum sentence of ten years.83 However, on
motion by the prosecution,84 the judge imposed a sentence of twelve
years under New Jersey’s “hate crime” law.85 The state law explicitly
provided for an “enhanced” sentence if the judge found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed the offense
“with purpose to intimidate.”86
Faced squarely and inescapably with the Sixth Amendment issue
raised but not decided in Jones,87 the Supreme Court held that, in the
absence of a jury waiver, jury-found facts prescribed the statutory
maximum.88 Drawing heavily on the fundamental constitutional
protections afforded under the Sixth Amendment, the Apprendi majority
“recognized that the [Sixth Amendment] jury right would be trivialized
79
Id. at 253. A defendant can waive the right to a jury, in which case a judge would
be the sole fact-finder. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
80
The Supreme Court applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance in which a
court interprets a statute in a manner that avoids constitutional issues. In Jones, the
majority bypassed the direct constitutional question by interpreting the statute at issue to
require “serious bodily injury” as an element of the crime. Rita v. United States, 127 S.
Ct. 2456, 2485 (J., Stevens, dissenting) (characterizing Jones as applying the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance.).
81
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
82
Apprendi fired shots into the home of an African-American family and later stated
that he desired to keep the family out of the neighborhood. Apprendi later retracted that
statement. Among other counts, he pled guilty to weapons charges carrying a maximum
penalty of five to ten years. Id. at 469.
83
Id.
84
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the prosecution reserved the right to request the
enhancement and Apprendi reserved the right to appeal on Constitutional grounds. Id. at
470.
85
Id. at 471.
86
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3 (West 2007).
87
The Court could no longer apply the doctrine of constitutional avoidance because
the New Jersey statute expressly provided for heightened exposure based on facts found
by the judge. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2485 (J., Stevens, dissenting).
88
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
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beyond recognition if that traditional practice could be extended to the
point that a judge alone . . . could find a fact necessary to raise the upper
limit of a sentencing range.”89 Thus, in extending the constitutional right
to a jury,90 the Supreme Court established a precedent that seriously
questioned the legitimacy of a mandatory Guidelines scheme.
D. Blakely v. Washington: Sixth Amendment Challenges to State
Sentencing Guidelines
In Blakely v. Washington,91 the Supreme Court considered a Sixth
Amendment challenge to a state sentencing system similar to the federal
Guidelines system. The defendant pled guilty to kidnapping charges
carrying a statutory maximum of ten years.92 However, under
Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act, a state analogue to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines, the trial court calculated a subrange
sentence of forty-nine to fifty-three months.93 The analogue further
provided that a judge could depart from the standard sentencing range
and impose “an exceptional sentence” upon a finding of certain
aggravating factors.94
The trial court rejected the government’s recommendation of a
standard-range sentence and imposed a sentence of ninety months
(greater than the forty-nine-to-fifty-three-month range established by the
jury verdict alone).95 The sentencing judge based this upward departure
upon a finding that the defendant acted with “deliberate cruelty.”96
In Blakely, the Supreme Court held that in order to comport with
the Sixth Amendment, the government must submit to a jury and prove
beyond a reasonable doubt any fact necessary to enhance a sentence
beyond a statutory subrange.97 The Blakely Court rejected the notion that
a judge could enhance a sentence beyond the subrange authorized by the
jury.98 Thus, the “statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the
89

Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2485 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497.
91
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299 (2004). Also note that the Court limited
its discussion to the scope of the Sixth Amendment without reference to the incorporation
doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
92
Id. at 299. Blakely pleaded guilty to kidnapping his estranged wife. Id. at 296.
93
Id. at 300.
94
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2485 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (discussing the holding in Blakely).
95
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300.
96
Id. at 300.
97
Id. at 313.
98
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 331 (2005); see Rita v. United States, 127
S. Ct. at 2487 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If Blakely had come out the other way, the
significance of Apprendi itself would be in jeopardy: a legislature would be free to bypass
Apprendi by providing an abnormally spacious sentencing range for any basic crime
90
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maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts
reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”99
E. United States v. Booker: The Advent of the Advisory Guidelines
System and Reasonableness Review
After Blakely, a Sixth Amendment challenge to the federal
Guidelines system followed in United States v. Booker,100 marking the
advent of the advisory Guidelines system and reasonableness review.
The government convicted Booker of possession with the intent to
distribute, which carried a maximum sentence of life imprisonment under
the applicable statute.101 The trial court’s calculation using the Guidelines
took into account both Booker’s criminal history and the quantity of
drugs established by the conviction, resulting in a sentence range of 210–
262 months.
At sentencing, however, the judge concluded that Booker actually
possessed a higher quantity of drugs and was guilty of obstruction of
justice.102 Accordingly, the judge imposed a thirty-year sentence (a
sentence substantially higher than the sentence authorized by the jury’s
verdict).103 Addressing the substantive issues presented by the case, a
narrow majority in the Supreme Court104 extended the holding in Blakely
to the federal Guidelines.105 The Court concluded that the same Sixth
Amendment requirements operative in the Washington sentencing
scheme applied to the federal Guidelines.106 The majority in the
substantive portion of the opinion acknowledged that the mandatory
nature of the Guidelines created the constitutional deficiency.107
However, the Justices disagreed over the appropriate remedy.108
[theoretically exposing a defendant to the highest sentence just by the jury’s guilty
verdict], then leaving it to a judge to make supplementary findings not only appropriate
but necessary for a sentence in a subrange at the high end. That would spell the end of
Apprendi and diminish the real significance of jury protection. . . .”).
99
Booker, 543 U.S. at 232 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
100
Id. The decision consolidated two cases: United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508
(7th Cir. 2004) and United States v. Fanfan, 03-47-P-H (D. Me. Jun. 28, 2004). This
comment only addresses the facts in the Booker case.
101
Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Justice Stevens delivered the substantive portion of the opinion with Justices
Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg joining.
105
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 223.
106
Booker, 543 U.S. at 226.
107
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 233 (“Indeed, everyone agrees that the constitutional
issues presented by the these cases would have been avoided entirely if Congress had
omitted from the SRA [“Sentencing Reform Act”] the provisions that make the
Guidelines binding on district judges . . . [f]or when a trial judge exercises his discretion
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One approach, endorsed vigorously by Justice Stevens in his
dissent,109 called for preserving the text of the Act but “superimposing”
the Sixth Amendment requirements.110 However, the majority ultimately
rejected Stevens’ approach in favor of altering the explicit text of the
Act.111 The Court reasoned that Congress would prefer excision—
removing the mandatory language within the text of the Act—to outright
invalidation or engrafting a Sixth Amendment requirement directly onto
the statute.112 Thus excision, the majority reasoned, would cure the
constitutional infirmity while maintaining congressional intent, to the
extent possible.113
Accordingly, the Supreme Court excised 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1),
the portion of the statute that required mandatory imposition of a
Guidelines sentence.114 However, removing section 3553(b)(1) also
required excision of section 3742(e), the section of the Act that provided
a de novo standard of review for sentences on appeal.115 The Court
reasoned that the excision was necessary because the provision contained
“critical cross-references” to section 3553(b)(1).116 In addition, the Court
opted to replace de novo review with reasonableness review, noting that
the sentencing statute had previously directed courts to determine if
sentences outside of the Guidelines range were “unreasonable” in light of
the section 3553(a) factors.117
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia attacked the foundations of
the remedial majority’s holding, particularly the reasonableness standard

to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury
determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.”).
108
Justice Breyer delivered the remedial portion of the opinion, joined by Justices
Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsberg.
109
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 272 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110
Id. at 247.
111
Id. at 249. The majority did not agree with Justice Stevens that the language of the
mandatory provision was facially constitutional. (“This provision makes it difficult to
justify Justice Stevens’ approach, for that approach requires reading the words ‘the court’
as if they meant ‘the judge working with the jury.’ Unlike Justice Stevens, we do not
believe we can interpret the statute’s language to save its constitutionality, because we
believe that any such reinterpretation, even if limited to the instances in which a Sixth
Amendment problem arises would be ‘plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.’”) Id. at
250 (internal citations omitted).
112
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 248–51, 258.
113
See id. at 258.
114
Id. at 259.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 260.
117
Id. Congress enacted section 3742(e) setting forth the de novo standard of review
in response to Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), which held that sentences were
to be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.
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of review.118 Among Justice Scalia’s many criticisms regarding the
majority’s decision to excise section 3742(e)119 was the concern that the
new reasonableness standard could function to perpetuate the very
system held unconstitutional.120 In ominous language, Justice Scalia
suggested that “unreasonableness review will produce a discordant
symphony of different standards, varying from court to court and judge
to judge . . . .”121 Indeed, the practical effects of the reasonableness
standard of review resulted in significant litigation, prompting the
Supreme Court to address the differing approaches among the circuits to
the application of the new standard.122
F. Rita v. United States: A Presumption of Reasonableness for WithinGuidelines Sentences
One approach to reasonableness review emerged in the form of a
presumption of reasonableness for within-Guideline sentences.123 In Rita
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that an appellate court could
apply such a presumption.124 The government convicted Rita of perjury
for lying to a grand jury under oath.125 Prior to sentencing, a probation
officer prepared a pre-sentence report and calculated Rita’s sentencing
range as between thirty-three and forty-one months under the
Guidelines.126
During the sentencing hearing, Rita’s attorney argued for a sentence
below the applicable Guidelines range, citing reasons not taken into
account by the Guidelines.127 The judge sentenced Rita to thirty-three
118

See Booker, 543 U.S. at 303–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia decried the majority’s inconsistency of excising section 3742(e)
while leaving intact several provisions that specify dispositions based on terminations
made under the provision as “rather like deleting the ingredients portion of a recipe and
telling the cook to proceed with the preparation portion.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 307. Justice
Scalia also rejected the majority’s logic in replacing an explicit standard of review by
relying on implications of the remaining statute. Id. (“The question is, when the Court has
severed that standard of review . . . does it make any sense to look for some congressional
‘implication’ of a different standard of review in the remnants of the statute that the Court
has left standing? Only in Wonderland.”) Id. at 309 (emphasis in original).
120
Id. at 311–12 (“[T]he remedial majority’s gross exaggerations . . . may lead some
courts to conclude—may indeed be designed to lead courts of appeals to conclude—that
little has changed.”).
121
Id. at 312.
122
See supra note 9.
123
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007).
124
Id. at 2459.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 2461.
127
Id. Rita argued that because of his prior employment in criminal justice, his
military experience, and his poor physical health, a below-guideline sentence was
therefore appropriate.
119
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months, the lower end of the Guidelines range, stating that he was
“unable to find that the [reports’ recommended] sentencing guideline
range . . . is an inappropriate guideline range . . . .”128 In affirming the
sentence, the Fourth Circuit stated that “a sentence imposed within the
properly calculated Guidelines range . . . is presumptively reasonable.”129
Justice Breyer, writing on behalf of the majority, concluded that a
circuit court could legally apply a presumption of reasonableness.130 He
explained that the presumption merely reflected the fact that both the
sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission arrived at the same
conclusion.131 Justice Breyer asserted that this “double determination”
resulted in an increased probability that the sentence was reasonable.132
In addition to permitting the presumption of reasonableness, the
Rita opinion reflects the Supreme Court’s view of the relationship
between substantive and procedural reasonableness review. Procedurally,
the Court determined that the district court’s allocution under section
3553(c)—the provision requiring the judge to “state in open court the
reasons for its imposition for the particular sentence”—was adequate.133
According to the opinion, such a statement should “set forth enough to
satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments
and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking
authority.”134
The Court found that the judge’s statement indicating the
Guidelines range was not “inappropriate” and was thus procedurally
sufficient.135 The majority then turned to the substance of Rita’s
sentence, upholding as appropriate the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that
the special circumstances provided by the defendant were not “special
enough” to warrant a below-Guidelines sentence. 136
In dissent, Justice Souter argued that a presumption of
reasonableness would undermine Apprendi, effectively returning courts
to a pre-Booker mandatory sentencing regime.137 The “gravitational pull”
128

Id. at 2462.
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2470 (2007).
Id. at 2459.
131
Id. at 2463.
132
Id. at 2465 (“[T]he courts of appeals’ ‘reasonableness’ presumption, rather than
having independent legal effect, simply recognizes the real-world circumstance that when
the judge’s discretionary decision accords with the Commission’s view of the appropriate
application of section 3553(a) in the mine run of cases, it is probable that the sentence is
reasonable.”).
133
Id. at 2468–69.
134
Id. at 2468.
135
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2469 (2007).
136
Id. at 2470.
137
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2487 (Souter, J., dissenting).
129
130
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of attaching a presumption to within-Guidelines sentences, Justice Souter
argued, “would tend to produce Guidelines sentences almost as regularly
as mandatory Guidelines had done, with judges finding the facts needed
for a sentence in an upper subrange.”138 Justice Souter proposed that an
appellate court should apply an across-the-board standard of
reasonableness to ensure that the entire range of statutorily authorized
sentences were available to the sentencing judge, in order to discourage
judges from imposing “appeal-proof” sentences within the Guidelines or
perpetuating the constitutional violations Booker sought to remedy.139
G. Gall v. United States: The Proportionality Principle
In Gall v. United States,140 the Supreme Court held that a strict
application of the “proportionality principle” was an improper
application of reasonableness review.141 In essence, the doctrine requires
the sentencing court to support a sentence falling outside the Guidelines
range by a justification that is “proportional to the extent of the
difference between the advisory range and the sentence imposed.”142
Gall, who entered into a plea agreement with the government, was
sentenced to a term of probation for thirty-six months, a 100% departure
from the thirty to thirty-seven-month imprisonment range under the
Guidelines.143
The district court judge issued a lengthy sentencing memorandum
listing several factors in support of the sentence under section 3553:
[T]he Defendant’s explicit withdrawal from the conspiracy
almost four years before the filing of the indictment, the
Defendant’s post offense conduct, especially obtaining a college
degree and the start of his own successful business, the support of
family and friends, lack of criminal history, and his age at the
time of the offense conduct, all warrant the sentence imposed . . .
.144

Thus, the sentencing court provided a substantial list of factors to support
a below-Guidelines sentence of probation. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit

138

Id. at 2487.
Id. at 2488.
140
Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007).
141
Id. at 591. The Court initially agreed to resolve the issue in United States v.
Claiborne, 127 U.S. 2245 (2007); however, Claiborne’s untimely death mooted the case
and delayed the Court’s consideration of the issue into the following term.
142
See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594.
143
Id. at 592–93.
144
Id.
139
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reversed, holding that there were not sufficient “extraordinary
circumstances” to support such an “extraordinary variance.”145
The Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s application of the
proportionality principle, characterizing the doctrine as a “rigid
mathematical formula that uses the percentage of a departure as the
standard for determining the strength of the justifications required for a
specific sentence.”146 Such an approach, the majority argued, would
“come too close to creating an impermissible presumption of
unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines range”147 and
undermine the abuse of discretion standard of review by applying a
heightened standard for below-Guidelines sentences.148
The Supreme Court then went on to apply the reasonableness
standard of review, both procedurally and substantively, to Gall’s
sentence. The Court concluded that the district judge was within his
discretion and that the Eighth Circuit inappropriately applied what
amounted to de novo review.149
As illustrated by the above cases, the transformation of the
mandatory Guidelines scheme originally envisioned by Congress to
reasonableness review under an advisory Guidelines system has been
arduous. From the initial Sixth Amendment challenges through the state
sentencing laws in Jones, Apprendi, and Blakely to the repudiation of
mandatory federal Guidelines in Booker, the Supreme Court has
struggled to fashion a coherent system that maintains the Congressional
vision of a unified system, while simultaneously curing the inherent
constitutional defects. Rita and Gall represent the Supreme Court’s latest
attempt to guide the sentencing process and resolve the constitutionality
of the various mechanisms the circuits have adopted.
Although the Supreme Court has established additional parameters
by endorsing a presumption of reasonableness in Rita and rejecting the
proportionality principle in Gall, the following cases illustrate how the
scope of reasonableness review is far from settled.

145
146
147
148
149

Id.
Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 595 (2007).
Id.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 601.
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III. THE APPLICATION OF THE REASONABLENESS STANDARD:
A PARADIGM OF CONFUSION
Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Rita, the exact scope and
operation of reasonableness review remains elusive and divisive.150
Statistical data suggests that post-Booker appellate courts have been
reluctant to reverse as substantively unreasonable sentences within the
Guidelines,151 affirm sentences with a substantial downward variance,152
and reverse above-Guidelines sentences.153
Since Rita, appeals courts throughout the circuits have interpreted
substantive reasonableness review as endorsing, at least on some level,
an evaluation of the underlying reason for imposition of a particular
sentence.154 The Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Tomko155

150

See, e.g., Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J.,
dissenting), vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v.
Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007).
151
Paul J. Hofer, Empirical Questions and Evidence in Rita v. United States, 85
DENV. U. L. REV. 31 (2007) (The New York Council of Defense Lawyers (“NYCDL”) as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners stated that circuit courts reversed only one withinGuidelines sentence as substantially unreasonable out of 1,152 sentences since Rita.).
152
Id. Data compiled by the NYCDL showed that 78.3 percent of below-Guideline
sentences appealed by the government were reversed, compared to 3.5 percent of aboverange sentences appealed by the defense. Id.
153
Id.
154
See, e.g., United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding a downward
sentencing departure unreasonable in light of section 3553 factors); United States v.
Coughlin, 500 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the district court did not
appropriately weigh the factors under section 3553); United States v. Bradford, 500 F.3d
808 (8th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the sentence reflected an overemphasis on the
relevance of the details of the offense and the defendant’s history under section
3553(a)(1) and accorded insufficient weight to existing congressional policy and the need
to minimize sentencing disparities); United States v. Hatcher, 501 F.3d 931 (8th Cir.
2007) (reversing sentence because the district court gave too much weight to an improper
factor); United States v. Garcia-Lara, 499 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the
district court ignored Congress’s policy of targeting recidivist drug offenders for more
severe punishment, and failed to distinguish defendant from other career offenders);
Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J., dissenting), vacated,
reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008) (reversing sentence as substantially
unreasonable because the district court failed to properly weigh sentencing factors);
United States v. Willingham, 497 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2007) (reversing sentence because
the district court placed too much weight on an irrelevant factor); United States v.
D’Amico, 496 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2007) (applying proportionality review and reversing
sentence as substantially unreasonable). But see United States v. Sanchez-Ramirez, 497
F.3d 531 (5th Cir. 2007) (upholding an above-Guidelines sentence as reasonable in light
of the defendant’s egregious conduct); United States v. Keller, 498 F.3d 316 (6th Cir.
2007); United States v. Gammicchia, 498 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming withinGuidelines sentence as substantially reasonable and applying a presumption of
reasonableness); United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007) (affirming
below-Guidelines sentence as substantively reasonable).
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and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Wachowiak156 are
indicative of the challenges circuit courts face in balancing procedure
and substance in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Rita.157
A. United States v. Tomko
In United States v. Tomko,158 the Third Circuit reversed as
unreasonable a sentence that was substantially below the Guidelines
range.159 Tomko pled guilty to tax evasion and received a sentence of
250 hours of community service, three years probation, and a $250,000
fine. The trial court imposed this noncustodial sentence despite a
recommended Guidelines range of twelve to eighteen months of
imprisonment.160 In addition, the sentencing judge provided a
comprehensive list of reasons for the sentence, taking into account the
section 3553 factors.161
Acknowledging that the standard of review “is akin to abuse of
discretion and accordingly deferential,”162 the Third Circuit framed the
scope of review as a determination of “whether the district judge
imposed the sentence he or she did for reasons that are logical and
consistent with the factors set forth in 3553(a).”163 The Third Circuit
interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Rita as emphasizing the role
of the appellate courts in providing substantive oversight.164 Thus, the
155
Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J., dissenting),
vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008).
156
United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007).
157
A number of cases have responded to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gall;
Tomko and Wachowiak were chosen because of their comprehensive analysis of Rita.
158
Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J., dissenting),
vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008). The case was subsequently vacated.
However, this does not change the relevance of the opinion, and perhaps further
illustrates the difficulties that the circuits face in applying the reasonableness standard of
review. United States v. Tomko, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 988 (3d Cir. Jan. 17, 2008)
(order vacating judgment and granting rehearing).
159
Tomko, 498 F.3d at 158.
160
Id. at 162.
161
Id. (After considering the section 3553 factors in detail, the sentencing judge
stated, “[h]owever, this need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records also gives me enough leniency to understand that there are
differences and those differences have to be taken into account. I recognize the need for
consistent sentencing; however, in this case, given the defendant’s lack of any significant
criminal history, his involvement in exceptional charitable work and community activity,
and his acceptance of responsibility, we find that a sentence that is mitigated by the
factors of 3553 are [sic] warranted.”).
162
Id. at 163 (citing Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007)).
163
Tomko, 498 F.3d at 163 (quoting United v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir.
2006).
164
Tomko, 498 F.3d at 163.
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Third Circuit suggested that “reasonableness review, while deferential, is
not utterly impotent.”165 Consequently, the court concluded that proper
substantive review requires actual reweighing of the section 3553
factors.166 In the final analysis, the Third Circuit disagreed with the
district court that the sentence imposed reflected the seriousness of the
crime, and held that the mitigating factors did not justify such a
substantial departure from the Guidelines sentence.167
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Smith criticized the majority’s approach,
equating the standard actually applied by the majority to a de novo
standard of review and a misapplication of the principles in Rita.168 The
dissent noted that the district court gave meaningful consideration to the
section 3553 factors and applied them in a reasonable manner to the
individual facts of the case.169 Thus, Judge Smith asserted, even though
the majority would have applied the section 3553 factors differently, a
district court’s sentence should be affirmed absent a showing that the
sentencing judge failed to give meaningful consideration to the
sentencing factors.170 A reweighing of factors, the dissent asserted, is
tantamount to de novo review, and improper under Booker.171
Moreover, Judge Smith suggested that by focusing exclusively on
the substance of the district court’s decision, the majority separated
substance from procedure in a manner inconsistent with the majority
opinion in Rita.172 According to the dissent, the majority’s emphasis on
the trial court’s treatment of the section 3553 factors rather than the
165

Id. at 165.
Id. at 165 n.7 (“To put it figuratively, there is a recipe for reasonableness that in
many, if not most cases, will lead to a palatable result, and we are not in a position to
protest if the result is a little too sweet or bitter for our taste. However, when a number of
key ingredients prescribed by that recipe are obviously missing from the mix, we cannot
ignore the omission and feign satisfaction—we are obliged to point out there is no proof
in the pudding.”).
167
Id. at 172 (“Viewed cumulatively, the three factors considered by the District
Court as mitigating factors—negligible criminal history, support and ties in the
community and charitable work, employment record—pale in comparison to the
numerous section 3553(a) factors suggesting that a term of imprisonment is warranted in
cases of tax evasion as willful and brazen as Tomko’s. A sentence of mere probation, in
light of these factors, is unreasonable and it was an abuse of discretion for the District
Court to impose it. We do not rule that any below-Guidelines sentence would have been
improper in this case, only that the District Court abused its discretion in rendering this
particular below-Guidelines sentence.”).
168
Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157, 173 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J., dissenting),
vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008).
169
See id. at 174.
170
Judge Smith noted that he would have imposed a term of imprisonment. Id. at 177.
171
Id. at 174.
172
Id. at 183 (“The Supreme Court in Rita repeatedly stressed the importance of the
process by which the sentencing court arrives at its conclusion.”).
166
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process by which the court arrived at its result illustrated this
inconsistency. Judge Smith viewed the majority’s approach as eroding
the remedial portion of Booker to create confusion among sentencing
courts in determining the “spectrum of cases that are ineligible for
substantial variances regardless of the reasons given by that judge.”173
B. United States v. Wachowiak
In United States v. Wachowiak, the Seventh Circuit embraced the
reasoning reflected by the dissent in Tomko, affirming a belowGuidelines sentence as reasonable.174 Wachowiak pled guilty to receiving
child pornography and received a seventy-month term of imprisonment
despite a recommended Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months.175 The
sentencing judge concluded that the Guidelines sentence was “greater
than necessary to achieve the sentencing purposes of section 3553(a)”
based on several mitigating circumstances, an individual assessment of
the section 3553(a) factors, and a determination that the Guidelines did
not adequately account for the appropriate individual circumstances of
the case.176
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the sentence, stating that a
reasonable sentence should reflect a “meaningful consideration [of]
sentencing factors enumerated in section 3553(a), including the advisory
sentencing guidelines.”177 Accordingly, the court indicated that a
sentence sufficiently justified by considering the proper statutory factors
should survive substantive reasonableness review.178 The Seventh Circuit
concluded that the district court’s sentence, “though certainly lenient
given the seriousness of the crime, lies tolerably within the boundaries of
permissible difference of judicial opinion.” 179 Thus, the Seventh Circuit
recognized that the yardstick of substantive reasonableness represents a
range of discretionary sentences.180 However, it conceded that some
sentences would continue to fall outside the bounds of reasonableness.181
173

Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157, 184 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J., dissenting),
vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008).
174
See United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744, 745 (7th Cir. 2007).
175
Id. at 746.
176
Id. at 746–47.
177
Id. at 748.
178
See id.
179
United States v. Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744, 755 (7th Cir. 2007).
180
See Wachowiak, 496 F.3d at 750 (quoting United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d
673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The concept of substantive reasonableness contemplates ‘a
range, not a point.’”)).
181
Id. (“A one-day sentence for a millionaire bank executive who stole nearly $1
million fell outside that range, as did a sentence of probation for a brokerage employee
who embezzled $400,000. A one-day sentence for possession of hundreds of highly
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Ultimately, both Tomko and Wachowiak illustrate the difficult
issues confronting circuit courts when applying the reasonableness
standard of review after Rita. The sentencing judges scrutinized in
Tomko and Wachowiak provided comprehensive explanations of the
reasons underlying their imposed sentences. However, the sentence
imposed in Tomko represents a greater departure from the Guidelines
than the sentence imposed in Wachowiak.182 Based on the court’s tone in
Wachowiak, the Seventh Circuit would likely have reversed a sentence
closer to the statutory minimum on substantive grounds.183 On the other
hand, the dissent in Tomko suggests that only a stripped down procedural
review can effectively preserve the integrity of the remedy mandated by
Booker.184 Although they represent early reactions, both Tomko and
Wachowiak provide a sampling of judicial adherence to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Rita. These divergent applications exemplify the
legal uncertainty that follows the decision.
IV. RITA AND GALL DID NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS OF REASONABLENESS REVIEW
Although the Supreme Court focused on narrow issues in both Rita
and Gall, the majority opinions in both cases discussed at length the
proper application and theoretical underpinnings of reasonableness
review.185 These decisions ultimately failed to adequately address many
of the criticisms of reasonableness review, forestalling the resolution of
several patent flaws identified by commentators and judges alike.186
Specifically, but by no means exhaustively, the Supreme Court: (1)
endorsed a presumption of reasonableness that further insulates withinGuidelines sentences, creating a de facto mandatory Guidelines system;
aggravated images of child pornography fell outside that range . . . as did a sentence of
one month for armed bank robbery. This sentence of seventy months for receiving child
pornography, though certainly lenient given the seriousness of the crime, lies tolerably
within the boundaries of permissible differences of judicial opinion.”).
182
The sentence in Tomko represented a one-hundred percent departure from the
recommended Guidelines range. Tomko, 498 F.3d at 162. Wachowiak received a seventymonth sentence despite a range of 121 to 151 months established by the Guidelines.
Wachowiak, 496 F.3d at 746.
184
Wachowiak, 496 F.3d at 751 (listing several examples of sentences that “help
illustrate the limits of Booker sentencing discretion”).
184
See Tomko, 498 F.3d at 173 (Smith, J., dissenting).
185
See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007); Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct.
586 (2007).
186
See, e.g., Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2475 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in
judgment); Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2487 (Souter, J., dissenting); Douglas A. Berman, Rita,
Reasoned Sentencing, and Resistance to Change, 85 DEN. U. L. REV. 7 (2007); Nancy
Gertner, Rita Needs Gall—How to Make the Guidelines Advisory, 85 DENV. U. L. REV.
65 (2007).
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(2) failed to provide adequate guidance for both appellate and district
courts as to the scope and application of substantive reasonableness
review; (3) left intact a conception of substantive review vulnerable to
as-applied constitutional challenges; and (4) issued opinions replete with
misguided Guidelines-centric language that frustrates the remedial
mandate of Booker.
A. The Presumption of Reasonableness Insulates Within-Guidelines
Sentences to Create a De Facto Mandatory Guidelines System
The issue addressed in Rita—whether or not appellate courts could use a
presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences—
provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to slow the re-emerging
prominence of the Guidelines in sentencing.187 However, the Court
succeeded in accomplishing the opposite result by wholeheartedly
approving a presumption that further insulates within-Guidelines
sentences, creating what amounts to a de facto mandatory guideline
system. In fact, the decision in Rita contained language that suggests
such a desired result.188 For example, Justice Breyer, writing for the
majority, observed that a “presumption, even if it increases the likelihood
that the judge, not the jury, will find ‘sentencing facts,’ does not violate
the Sixth Amendment.”189 In support of this contention, Justice Breyer
argued that a non-binding presumption does not implicate the Sixth
Amendment because a non-binding presumption neither requires nor
forbids any sentence within the statutory range of sentences available.190
Interestingly, Justice Breyer’s argument implies that a presumption
of reasonableness does not legally affect the advisory system, even if the
actual result is to increase the frequency of within-Guidelines sentences
to levels consistent with a pre-Booker mandatory system.191 Therefore,
the majority was not concerned if the actual result of the presumption
created a “gravitational pull” toward the Guidelines, because such a
result would not render the advisory scheme unconstitutional.192 Justice

187
The Court was presented with an opportunity to issue an opinion consistent with
the “Booker maximalism” interpretation in which it could have instructed that the
Guidelines are only to be taken into consideration by the sentencing judge. “Booker
minimalists” argue that such a transformation was not the intended result of Booker. The
presumption of reasonableness endorsed in Rita is consistent with the latter approach.
See McConnell, supra note 22, at 666.
188
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465–66.
189
Id. at 2465.
190
Id.
191
See Hofer, supra note 151, at 30.
192
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2467.
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Breyer asserted that this result is consistent with the Sixth Amendment,
and also consistent with the policies of Congress.193
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens discounted the effect of
the presumption’s “gravitational pull,” arguing that the abuse-ofdiscretion standard, explicitly provided in Booker, requires deference to
sentences which consider the section 3553 factors.194 This position is
subtly distinct from the majority’s position. Justice Stevens suggested
that the standard of review protects sentencing judges and therefore
judges should not, at least in theory, be obligated to impose withinGuidelines sentences,195 whereas the majority’s position appears to
encourage such a result.196 Despite Justice Stevens’ complacency with
the abuse of discretion standard, empirical data has suggested that
appellate courts are unwilling to countenance sentences falling outside of
the Guidelines range.197
In essence, Rita’s endorsement of a presumption of reasonableness
is difficult to reconcile with the advisory Guidelines system mandated in
Booker. The Rita majority’s position rested on the premise that the
presumption does not require judges to impose within-Guidelines
sentences.198 While this may be true, the practical effect has been to
insulate Guidelines sentences by implicitly encouraging judges to impose
within-Guidelines sentences. Such a system effectively mirrors the preBooker scheme.199
Justice Souter argued that if Booker is to have any meaning at all,
judges must be free to depart from the Guidelines.200 As he warned in his
dissent, if judges treat the Guidelines as “persuasive or presumptively
appropriate, the Booker remedy would in practical terms preserve the
very feature of the Guidelines that threatened to trivialize the jury
right.”201 Indeed, the Court’s decision in Rita approving the presumption
of reasonableness only serves to insulate within-Guidelines sentences,
creating a de facto mandatory system. Such a system merely pays lip
service to the advisory scheme designed to remedy the constitutional
defects identified in Booker.

193

Id.
Id. at 2470 (Stevens, J., concurring).
195
Id.
196
See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2466.
197
See Hofer, supra note 151, at 31 (Data compiled by the NYCDL showed that 78.3
percent of below-Guideline sentences appealed by the government were reversed.).
198
See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2466.
199
See Tomko, 498 F.3d at 173 (Smith, J., dissenting).
200
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2487 (Souter, J., dissenting).
201
Id.
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B. Substantive Reasonableness Review Remains an Ambiguous Standard
of Review
The Supreme Court’s conception of substantive review remains
ambiguous and difficult to apply. The dissent in Tomko asserted that the
“gravitational pull” toward a within-Guidelines sentence created by
substantive review is even greater than that of a “nonbinding appellate
presumption,” because it encourages judges to impose within-Guidelines
sentences.202 While the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Rita
provides some clues as to the appropriate sentencing procedure courts are
to utilize, the interaction between substance and procedure remains
ambiguous.203
For instance, the majority in Rita spends considerable time
discussing the sentencing analysis a district court should implement.204
The Court explained that the “sentencing judge should set forth enough
to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
decisionmaking authority.”205 The threshold of this “reasoned basis” in
the facts of the case was apparently fairly low206 and somehow
proportional to the conceptual complexity of the arguments presented.207
The Court further explained that the “sentencing judge has access to, and
greater familiarity with, the individual case and the individual defendant
before him than the Commission or the appeals court,” which allows the
sentencing judge to utilize his “reasoned sentencing judgment, resting
upon an effort to filter the Guidelines’ general advice through [18
U.S.C.] § 3553(a)’s list of factors.” 208
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s intended scope of procedural
review is not entirely clear.209 The Court has emphasized a reasoned
analysis of the section 3553 factors informed by the Guidelines and even
suggests that a party can argue that “the Guidelines’ sentence itself fails

202

Tomko, 498 F.3d at 184.
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2467.
Id.
205
Id. at 2468.
206
The sentencing judge in Rita simply stated that the Guidelines range was not
“inappropriate.” Id. at 2469.
207
Id. at 2468 (“In our view, given the straightforward, conceptually simple
arguments before the judge, the judge’s statement of reasons here, though brief, was
legally sufficient.”); see also Id. at 2469 (“Where a matter is as conceptually simple as in
the case at hand and the record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the
evidence and arguments, we do not believe the law requires the judge to write more
extensively.”).
208
Rita, 127 S. Ct., at 2456.
209
See, e.g., Berman, supra note 38, at 15.
203
204
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properly to reflect § 3553(a),”210 but it has never explained the practical
implications of this statement. As illustrated in Tomko, the circuit courts
enjoy little guidance regarding the extent of substantive review, and have
interpreted Rita to mean that substantive reasonableness review allows
an appellate court to re-weigh the section 3553 factors for sentencing.211
Similarly, Gall reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s endorsement of
both substantive and procedural review.212 The Court reiterated that
reasonableness review should give due deference to the district courts
and that the “reasoned and reasonable decision that [the district court
gave] the section 3553 factors, on the whole, justified the [defendant’s
probationary] sentence.”213
The analysis consisted of a determination that the Eighth Circuit’s
arguments against imposition of the sentence of probation, based on
section 3553, did not overcome the rational arguments asserted by the
lower court. While Gall established that “proportionality” review goes
too far and that “the extent of the difference between a particular
sentence and the recommended Guidelines range” are relevant to the
inquiry, 214 it remains unclear exactly when an appeals court may
overturn a sentence as substantively unreasonable.215

210

Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465.
Id.
211
Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157, 173 (3d Cir. 2005).
212
Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 602 (2007).
213
Id.
214
Id. at 591.
215
See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. The Court described substantive reasonableness review
as follows:
Assuming that the district court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound,
the appellate court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. When conducting this
review, the court will, of course, take into account the totality of the
circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.
If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the appellate court may, but is
not required to, apply a presumption of reasonableness . . . But if the sentence
is outside the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a presumption of
unreasonableness. It may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give
due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a
whole, justify the extent of the variance. The fact that the appellate court might
reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is
insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The Court’s articulation of substantive review provides
only vague standards while emphasizing that an appellate court must give the sentencing
court due deference. Exactly when a sentence has reached the threshold of
unreasonableness remains elusive.
210
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C. Reasonableness Review is Still Vulnerable to As-Applied
Constitutional Challenges
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment in Rita, criticized the
majority opinion as avoiding the constitutional issues presented by the
reasonableness standard of review.216 Scalia’s basic argument, admittedly
not presented directly by the circumstances in Rita or Gall, is that, under
the substantive reasonableness review endorsed by the Supreme Court,
there will be some sentences upheld as reasonable based solely on judgefound facts, which under Booker represents an unconstitutional
deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury. Thus, Scalia argued,
reasonableness review is vulnerable to as-applied constitutional
challenges.217
Scalia illustrated his point with hypotheticals.218 The “two brothers”
hypothetical assumed that the government convicted two brothers of
robbing a bank; one chose the particular bank because of racial bias, the
other because of the perception that the bank’s location would be
advantageous.219 Both brothers receive the maximum sentence under the
statute.220 On review, Justice Scalia contended, the appellate court would
reverse the sentence of the “non-racist” brother as unreasonable and
affirm the sentence of the biased brother.221 The racially-biased brother’s
sentence would be lawful only because of a judge-found fact.222
The second example is a more likely scenario in which aggravating
factors significantly increase a convicted bank robber’s sentencing range
under the Guidelines; for example, if the defendant discharged a firearm
or a victim incurred serious bodily injury.223 Accordingly, a sentence
would only be reasonable based on the judge-found facts because if these
facts did not exist, the appellate court would likely reverse the sentence
as unreasonable.224 Therefore, Justice Scalia explained, the authority to
review the substance of the district court’s sentence would result in
sentences that could only be justified on the basis of judge-found facts.225
Justice Scalia suggested that the constitutional implications are avoided

216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225

Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2475 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 2476–77.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2475 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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by abandoning substantive reasonableness review altogether and limiting
appellate courts to review sentences only for procedural deficiencies.226
In Rita, Justice Breyer dismissed these criticisms of the majority,
adding that Justice Scalia’s “need to rely on hypotheticals to make his
point is consistent with our view that the approach adopted here will not
‘raise a multitude of constitutional problems.’”227 Thus, Justice Breyer
essentially conceded the point, yet adhered to the belief that the issue
would arise infrequently.228 This argument, however, is unsatisfactory
because Booker mandated reasonableness review as a means to cure the
very same constitutional defect—that increased exposure to heightened
penalties based on judge-found facts is a violation of the Sixth
Amendment. Therefore, the only difference between the as-applied
constitutional defect identified by Justice Scalia and the defect identified
in Booker is that an appeals court is evaluated in the former and the
sentencing judge is assessed in the latter.
D. The Guidelines-centric Approach is Misguided and Frustrates the
Remedy in Booker
In many ways, Rita and Gall underscored and endorsed a
continuing reliance by the federal judiciary on sentences calculated under
the Guidelines,229 perpetuating a misguided system and frustrating the
remedy in Booker. The Supreme Court spent very little time discussing
the actual text of the section 3553 factors, focusing instead on the dualreasonableness of the Guidelines while approving a presumption that
further insulates within-Guidelines sentences.230
The majority in Rita argued that “where judge and Commission
both determine that the Guidelines sentences [sic] is an appropriate
sentence for the case at hand, that sentence likely reflects the
section 3553(a) factors (including its ‘not greater than necessary’
requirement).”231

226

Id. at 2476.
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2466 (2007) (quoting Clark v. Martinez,
543 U.S. 371, 380–81 (2005)).
228
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2466.
229
For a discussion on sentencing conservatism among the circuit courts, see Berman,
supra note 38.
230
See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2462 (“[T]he presumption reflects the fact that, by the time
an appeals court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence on review, both the
sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion
as to the proper sentence in the particular case. That double determination significantly
increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one.”).
231
Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456 at 2467.
227
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This recognition assumes that sentences under the Guidelines
actually achieved the goals set forth by Congress under section 3553 and
that sentencing judges independently determined sentences within
Congress’s framework. At least one author has criticized these
assumptions. Judge Nancy Gertner, a district court judge for the District
of Massachusetts, stated in a recent article on Rita, “Justice Breyer’s
analysis of the Guidelines rationale reiterates the ideology of the
Guidelines formation—not their actual genesis or operation.”232 In other
words, although the Sentencing Commission has adopted the policy
statements identified by Congress, the resulting sentences do not reflect
these same goals.233 This issue is arguably most apparent in drug cases.
Judge Gertner observed:
You apply the Sentencing Guidelines, as you have been told you
must, and you tally up the numbers and determine where the
defendant is on the grid, and ultimately come up with a result that
makes no sense by any measure. It is inconsistent with the
purposes of sentencing in the Sentencing Reform Act . . . it is out
of proportion to the defendant’s culpability and to sentences that
have been meted out for far worse, even violent offenses; it is not
at all what the public—if they knew all the facts—would
demand.234

In essence, Judge Gertner identified a fundamental disconnect between
the Guidelines and the penological polices identified by Congress.
The discrepancy between the Congressional goals and the sentences
produced by the Guidelines might be explained by the Guidelines’
predominant focus on offense conduct.235 Offense conduct relates to the
defendant’s actions during the commission of the crime, such as
brandishing a weapon, the amount of harm suffered by the victim, or the
class of crime committed.236 Offender characteristics relate to the
circumstances surrounding the defendant’s history.237 The district court
typically considers both offense conduct and offense characteristics.238
However, the Guidelines tend only to focus on offense conduct,
discounting a number of offender characteristics as “not ordinarily
relevant” such as “age; education and vocational skills; mental and
232
Nancy Gertner, Federal Sentencing Survey: Rita Needs Gall—How To Make the
Guidelines Advisory, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 63, 69 (2007).
233
See id.
234
Id. at 63.
235
Jeffrey S. Hurd, Comment, Federal Sentencing and the Uncertain Future of
Reasonableness Review, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 835, 851 (2007).
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id.
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emotional conditions; physical condition; employment record; family ties
and responsibilities; previous military, public or charitable service; and
lack of guidance as a youth.”239
Significantly, the Guidelines Manual exempts from this list the
defendant’s criminal history, which, along with offense category,
establishes the defendant’s applicable sentence range.240 Consequently,
the Guidelines directly contradict the Sentencing Act, which instructs a
court to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant.”241
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s continued focus on the Guidelines
as the centerpiece of sentencing reinforces a tendency among sentencing
judges to apply a within-Guidelines sentence unless the defendant can
demonstrate that his individual case warrants a departure.242 Judge
Gertner identified the district court judge’s comments in Rita as a typical
example:
At sentencing, the district court heard Rita’s presentation but
concluded that it was ‘unable to find that the . . . sentencing
guideline range . . . is an inappropriate guideline range for that. . .
. Clearly, the court’s remarks suggest that Rita had to show that
he was somehow extraordinary, not the usual person in this
guideline range.243

As Judge Gertner observed, the above allocution does not reflect an
independent determination of reasonableness confirmed by the
Guidelines, but instead demonstrates rote application of the Guidelines
absent some showing that a within-Guidelines sentence was
inappropriate in the case.244
Additionally, the current Guidelines-centric approach only serves to
perpetuate the Sixth Amendment constitutional deficiencies the Supreme
Court sought to eliminate in the remedial portion of Booker. In order to
cure the constitutional defects of the mandatory system, Booker
mandated an advisory scheme.245 However, the Supreme Court has
continued to limit actual discretion by emphasizing the Guidelines as the
dominant factor and starting point of all sentencing determinations.246
239

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
241
Hurd, supra note 235, at 851 (emphasis added). See also the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (1984).
242
See Hurd, supra note 235, at 851.
243
Gertner, supra note 232, at 230.
244
See id.
245
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 225 (2004).
246
See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465–66 (2007).
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Furthermore, substantive reasonableness review insulates withinGuidelines sentences by enabling appellate courts to overturn sentences
falling outside of the Guidelines range.247 Thus, while Booker gives a
judge freedom to depart from the Guidelines, below-Guidelines
sentences are susceptible to substantive scrutiny akin to de novo
review.248 The combined effect of this Guidelines-centric approach and
substantive reasonableness review is a return to a de facto mandatory
scheme, with “advisory” an empty adjective. Such a system is
constitutionally repugnant under Booker.249
Ultimately, Rita and Gall failed to adequately address the
fundamental flaws of reasonableness review. Rita endorsed a
presumption of reasonableness that further insulates within-Guidelines
sentences, creating a de facto mandatory guideline system.250
Additionally, the Supreme Court failed to provide adequate guidance for
both appellate and district courts as to the scope and application of
substantive reasonableness review, leaving circuit courts with the task of
trying to determine exactly when a sentence reaches the threshold of
reasonableness. Moreover, the Supreme Court left intact a conception of
substantive review vulnerable to as-applied constitutional challenge.
Finally, both Rita and Gall are replete with Guidelines-centric language
that further frustrates the remedial mandate of Booker. If the Supreme
Court seeks to fashion a sentencing jurisprudence that passes
constitutional muster, the Court must effectuate a significant change in
course.251
V. PROCEDURAL REASONABLENESS REVIEW AND A PARSIMONYCENTRIC APPROACH WOULD ALLEVIATE THE ISSUES THE SUPREME
COURT NEGLECTED IN GALL AND RITA
As discussed above, many of the challenges confronting both
district and appellate courts stem from a misguided emphasis on the
247

See, e.g., Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J.,
dissenting), vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008).
248
See Tomko, 498 F.3d at 173.
249
See id.
250
See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2466 (2007) (“Rita may be correct that
the presumption will encourage sentencing judges to impose Guidelines sentences. But
we do not see how that fact could change the constitutional calculus.”).
251
Of course, Congress could solve many of these problems by requiring that all facts
necessary to enhance a sentence under the Guidelines be submitted to a jury. See Booker,
543 U.S. at 270 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This comment only discusses the role of the
Supreme Court in addressing the issues that have arisen since Booker. Congress is free to
amend the sentencing statute as it deems necessary (within the Constitutional framework
established by the Court). However, Congress has thus far declined to do so, and until
amendments are made, the Court must adhere to its holding in Booker.
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Sentencing Guidelines. Further, appellate courts have essentially
unfettered authority to review the substance of sentences that deviate
from those Guidelines. As a result, the Supreme Court has seriously
jeopardized the advisory system that Booker implemented.
The Supreme Court may alleviate the critical issues neglected in
Gall and Rita by developing a parsimony-centric approach to sentencing
in district courts and by advocating procedural reasonableness review of
those sentences by the appellate courts. The words “parsimony-centric”
imply a de-emphasis on the Guidelines. By de-emphasizing the
importance of the Guidelines, the Supreme Court would promote a more
holistic approach, enabling the sentencing court to rely on the section
3553 factors in their entirety. Additionally, a review based on procedure
would facilitate discretion by limiting review to patently procedural
flaws. Both of these proposals tend to produce a sentencing scheme that
is more consistent with the Supreme Court’s remedy in Booker—a
Guidelines system that is truly advisory.
The problems associated with substantive reasonableness review
are twofold. First, the process allows appellate courts to effectively reweigh the section 3553 factors, resulting in the erosion of the judicial
discretion mandated by Booker.252 Second, as Justice Scalia asserted in
his Rita dissent, substantive review is vulnerable to as-applied
constitutional challenges.253 The Supreme Court could resolve both
problems by greatly limiting the scope of reasonableness review by
appellate courts down to a highly deferential, procedural review.
Procedural reasonableness review would foreclose as-applied
constitutional challenges. Under the current conception of substantive
reasonableness review, the courts of appeals will uphold certain cases as
reasonable based solely on judge-found facts.254 Although such cases
would be rare, or at least rarely obvious from the factual circumstances
of the case,255 this argument underscores the inherent unconstitutionality
of substantive review. Procedural review would eliminate this issue
because appellate courts would lose their freedom to independently
evaluate the sentencing judge’s justifications for the chosen sentence. A
sentence would not be reasonable or unreasonable based solely on the
factual determinations of an appeals court.256 Therefore, there will not be
252

See, e.g., Tomko, 498 F.3d at 183–84.
Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2478 (Scalia J., concurring).
254
Id.
255
Justice Scalia illustrates this using two stylized hypotheticals. See supra Part IV.C.
256
Returning to Justice Scalia’s hypotheticals, a sentence which was substantially
increased because a firearm was involved would not be upheld as reasonable solely
because of that fact; rather it would be upheld because the sentencing judge did not rely
253
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an occasion for judicial fact-finding by the appellate courts; a court of
appeals could only overturn a sentence if it was procedurally deficient.257
In addition, a stripped-down procedural review would revitalize
judicial discretion. The remedial decision in Booker laid the groundwork
for reasonableness review. In Rita, Justice Stevens asserted that Booker
“plainly contemplated . . . a substantive component.”258 The Supreme
Court emphasized that, while sentencing judges must impose sentences
that consider the section 3553 factors, an appellate court could still
overturn a sentence as substantively unreasonable.259 Accordingly,
substantive reasonableness review effectively allows an appellate court
to reconsider a sentencing judge’s decision. Such a conception
essentially draws a line between substance and procedure.260
However, substance and procedure often overlap.261 Reconfiguring
the reasonableness standard of review so that courts would elevate
procedure over substance would not completely eliminate an appeals
court’s ability to overturn a sentence on substantive grounds. While an
appellate court could not reweigh the section 3553 factors, a sentence
issued by a district court based on patently flawed logic, impermissible
circumstances, or clearly erroneous facts is both substantively and
procedurally deficient.262 Thus, a procedurally-based review would
ensure that district court judges truly have discretion to sentence within
statutory range as long as the sentence reflects a careful consideration of
the section 3553 factors, including the Guidelines as one factor.
On balance, the circuit courts have not embraced this view.263 Both
Tomko and, to a lesser degree, Wachowiak, interpret the Supreme Court’s
decision in Rita as advocating a notion of substantive review where
on clearly erroneous facts or some other procedural deficiency. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456,
2478 (Scalia J., concurring), and supra Part IV.C.
257
Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2478 (Scalia, J., concurring).
258
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2473.
259
See id. at 2466.
260
See Tomko, 498 F.3d at 183.
261
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2481 n.6 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“‘Substance’ and ‘procedure’
are admittedly chameleon-like terms. As the text indicates, my use of the term
‘procedure’ here includes the limiting of sentencing factors to permissible ones—as
opposed to using permissible factors but reaching a result that is ‘substantively’ wrong.”)
(internal citations omitted).
262
Justice Scalia envisioned a system in which appellate courts could reverse a
sentence that “appears not to have considered section 3553(a); considers impermissible
factors; selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts; or does not comply with
section 3553(c)’s requirement of statement of reasons.” Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2483 (Scalia
J., concurring).
263
See, e.g., Tomko v. United States, 498 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2007) (Smith, J.,
dissenting), vacated, reh’g granted, 513 F.3d 360 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v.
Wachowiak, 496 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2007).

482

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 4:447

substance outweighs procedure.264 A procedurally-based review would
likely assuage the dissent in Tomko, which regarded the substantive
review as trivializing the Booker decision, thus creating uncertainty
among the district courts.265 Although the Wachowiak court exercised a
greater degree of deference to the district court, there remains a range of
sentences, which at some undefined threshold would trigger the court’s
authority to reverse on substantive grounds.266
However, Rita and Gall do not preclude procedural substantive
review. In fact, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on reasoned sentencing in
both decisions provides the foundation for a departure from the
Guidelines-centric approach. Professor Berman, a leading commentator
on sentencing policy, recently remarked that “the Rita decision
emphasized (though opaquely) the importance of sentencing rulings as
reasoned decisions . . . the ruling still sent an important signal that
district and circuit judges should—indeed, must—explore and
contemplate the reasons for specific sentencing outcomes.”267 Gall
reflects the Court’s emphasis on procedure and individualized sentencing
as well.268
Indeed, the parsimony principle underlies the Sentencing Reform
Act, which provides that a sentence should be “sufficient but not greater
than necessary” to achieve the policies enumerated under section 3553.269
By emphasizing the sentencing factors outlined by Congress, as opposed
to affording greater weight to the Guidelines, the Supreme Court would
give greater effect to the advisory system. Such a system would allow a
judge the freedom to depart from the Guidelines when, in light of the
section 3553 sentencing factors, the Guideline sentence would result in a
sentence “greater than necessary” to achieve the basic goals set forth by
Congress.270
Ultimately, a procedurally-based reasonableness review coupled
with a holistic, parsimony-centric approach to sentencing would activate
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the basic holding in Booker by giving sentencing judges the freedom to
impose a sentence within the full statutory range. While Rita and Gall
appear to embrace the Guidelines as the center of sentencing
jurisprudence, they do not preclude a departure from substantive review.
The Supreme Court decided Booker to prevent judges from finding
facts that permit them to impose sentences that contravene the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury. Continued application of substancedominated review discourages the very judicial discretion central to an
advisory scheme. Moreover, substantive review is vulnerable to asapplied constitutional challenges. Finally, an emphasis on the parsimony
principle rather than the Guidelines would return the Guidelines system
to its proper place as one factor among several policy considerations
identified by Congress as appropriate in sentencing.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sentencing jurisprudence is a highly important and significant area
of law that is easily consumed by abstract complexities. In United States
v. Booker,271 the Court held that the application of the Guidelines would
no longer be mandatory and that appellate courts would review sentences
for reasonableness. For better or for worse, the Supreme Court’s decision
in Booker implemented an advisory Guidelines system designed to
ensure that people convicted of crimes receive sentences on the basis of
facts proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.272 In United States v.
Booker,273 the Court held that the application of the Guidelines would no
longer be mandatory and that appellate courts would review sentences
for reasonableness.274
In an attempt to apply the reasonableness standard, the circuit
courts have devised different doctrines for determining when a sentence
is in fact unreasonable.275 The Supreme Court addressed the validity of
two of these doctrines in Rita v. United States276 and Gall v. United
States.277 Rita held that a presumption of reasonableness for within-
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Guidelines sentences is not inconsistent with the advisory Guidelines.278
In Gall, however, the Supreme Court held that the circuits cannot apply
the so-called “proportionality principle,” a standard that would overturn
sentencing decisions that do not provide proportional reasons for
deviating from a Guidelines sentence.279 Although the Court reconciled
these specific approaches with reasonableness review, the exact scope of
reasonableness review remains ambiguous.
Tomko280 and Wachowiak281 indicate the ambiguity of
reasonableness review among the circuits. While reaching different
results, the Third and Seventh Circuits construed Rita as approving a
substantively-based standard of review in which appellate courts can
reverse sentences deemed to be substantively unreasonable.282 Despite
disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the Wachowiak court upheld the
lower court’s sentence, citing Rita for the proposition that appellate
courts should afford a high level of deference to the district court.283 The
Tomko court essentially reconsidered the section 3553 factors, finding
the justifications offered by the sentencing judge to be inadequate.284
Taken together, the cases reflect a core disagreement among the circuit
courts over the scope of substantive review.
Ultimately, Rita and Gall failed to address the fundamental flaws
inherent in reasonableness review in a number of different ways. First,
the presumption of reasonableness only serves to insulate and encourage
Guideline sentences, threatening the very foundations of the remedial
portion of Booker.285 Second, the majorities in both Rita and Gall
continue to privilege the Guidelines and endorse a substantive
reasonableness review in which the appellate courts can effectively
reweigh sentencing factors.286 This “gravitational pull” toward the
Guidelines further frustrates the Booker remedy and prevents judges
from exercising any meaningful discretion.287 Third, substantive
reasonableness review is vulnerable to as-applied constitutional
challenges similar to those addressed in Booker, except appellate judges
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determine the facts necessary to support a reasonable sentence in those
instances, rather than trial judges.288 Finally, the Supreme Court
continues to endorse a Guidelines-centric approach to sentencing that
fails to effectively fulfill the goals outlined by Congress under section
3553 of the Sentencing Reform Act.289
An approach that elevates procedure over substance, along with a
holistic, parsimony-centric reliance on the statutory factors outlined by
Congress, would effectively alleviate these fundamental flaws.
Sentencing judges could then exercise meaningful discretion that is
integral to the protection of the constitutional rights of criminal
defendants and to the preservation of the Supreme Court’s remedial
holding in Booker. Additionally, a procedurally-based system would
eliminate as-applied constitutional challenges based on judicial fact
finding by appellate courts.
Moreover, the Supreme Court should encourage sentencing judges
to account for all of the sentencing factors set forth by Congress,
including, but not privileging, the Sentencing Guidelines. This approach
would ensure that sentences are “sufficient but not greater than
necessary” in accordance with the overarching provision set forth by
Congress in section 3553.290 As Justice Scalia observed in his dissent in
Rita, “[i]t is all too real that advisory Guidelines sentences routinely
change months and years of imprisonment to decades and centuries on
the basis of judge-found facts—as Booker itself recognized.”291 Perhaps
the Court will finally become cognizant of the practical implications of
sentencing jurisprudence when it inevitably faces the next round of
challenges to reasonableness review.
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